[Owasp-topten] T10 RC2

Jeremiah Grossman jeremiah at whitehatsec.com
Fri May 25 17:24:24 EDT 2007


Here is my feedback (rewrite) of the “VERIFYING SECURITY” sections of  
the OWASP Top 10 2007. Sorry that this comes at such a late stage.

Some quick things:
1)   The Automated approaches should be separated into Automated  
penetration testing tools and Automated source code scanning tools,  
which are already separate from the manual approach. This seems to  
make the most sense as the capabilities of the tools are different  
between them and shouldn’t be lumped together.

2)   For the automated penetration testing tools, we should include  
generic language at the top of the document, which the guidance is  
predicated on. For instance the scanner must be configured to get a  
complete crawl of the website with application functionality, able to  
maintain login state during all stages of testing, and able to parse  
the URLs to find the injection points.

3)   My text is only covering the automated penetration testing  
tools, as this is where my expertise is, and should be sanity checked  
by at least one other similar vendor. Could use more content cleaning  
and examples.

4)   On the automated source code scanning tools, someone else  
familiar with the technology should be enlisted to write that text.  
I’m not intimate with how far that has come.

A1: Automated penetration testing tools are adept at identifying  
reflected XSS vulnerabilities through exhaustive parameter injection  
testing. The same tools perform marginally at identifying persistent  
XSS for variety of reasons including the output maybe not accessible  
to a scanners current authentication level, echo only at some point  
in the future, or appear on another seemingly unrelated website.  
Automated penetration testing tools also have a challenging time  
identifying DOM-based XSS because of the difficulty in automatically  
navigating and executing the browser DOM.

A2: Automated penetration testing tools are adept at identifying many  
forms on Injection Flaws including SQL / LDAP/ XML/ XPath Injection,  
through the use of detailed error message generated by the system. If  
however the application suppresses the server errors, as they should,  
it can significantly hamper automated tools, but the code may still  
be at risk. In recent years tools have become better at testing for  
these types of issues while blind, without the use of error messages,  
but the false positive and false negative rate is still considered high.

A3: Vulnerability scanning tools do a fairly decent job at  
identifying the majority of vulnerable parameter values used in a  
file includes. They do suffer from notable false negative rate in  
circumstances where the command or file execution results are not  
apparent by analyzing the resulting response.

A4: Vulnerability scanning tools will have difficulty identifying  
which parameters are susceptible to manipulation or whether the  
manipulation worked.

A5: Vulnerability scanning tools are largely unable to detect the  
CSRF vulnerabilities without some form of human assistance. The  
challenge is that every “important” feature of a website must be  
checked and technology has a difficult time understanding importance  
in context. Further, should a CSRF attack be successful, its hard for  
a scanner to generically determine what the results should look like  
for vulnerability identification.

A6: Vulnerability scanning tools do a good job at identifying  
information leakage and improper error handling in many cases. They  
can spot internal IP address, social security and credit card  
numbers, memory stack traces, debug messages, internal ip addresses,  
etc. However, there are other types of data and data formats that  
websites should not be revealing that are difficult for scanners to  
detect. For instance software revision numbers, intellectual  
property, or passwords. If the data is encoded or slightly  
obfuscated, even using Base64 or Rot13, the job is made that much  
harder for the scanner.

A7: Vulnerability scanning tools have a very difficult time  
identifying vulnerabilities in custom authentication and session  
management schemes. They can however perform rigorous mathematical  
analysis on session token and credential by sampling hundreds by  
comparing and looking for patters of predictability. Areas or  
predictability or lack of sufficient entropy can be telltale signs of  
weakness requiring further review.

A8: Vulnerability scanning tools have very limited or zero visibility  
into the cryptographic storage mechanisms of a website or web  
applications.

A9: Vulnerability scanning tools can verify that SSL and level of  
supported encryption is used on the front end and able to find many
SSL related flaws. However, they do not possess visibility into the  
backend connections between web server, application server, and  
database to verify they are secure.

A10: Vulnerability scanning tools are able to guess the names of  
hundred or even thousands pages and on website. They’ll often uncover  
orphaned files and directories including backup files, source code,  
intellectual property and other data and functionality that should  
not be present on the website. What they cannot do is assess the  
value of this data/functionality or determine if a user of a  
particular access level should be able to access it in accordance  
with the expected business logic of the website.





On May 9, 2007, at 3:07 PM, Andrew van der Stock wrote:

> Hi folks,
>
> At long last, here's the OWASP Top 10 2007 RC2. We're going to push  
> this out
> next week at the conference, so it's edits and emergency changes only.
> Please download and read.
>
> PDF: (980 kb)
> http://www.owasp.org/images/f/f2/OWASP_Top_10_RC2.pdf
>
> Word: (520 kb)
> http://www.owasp.org/images/e/e7/OWASP_Top_10_2007_RC2.doc
>
> Translators, you can start now as I'll use tracking changes between  
> RC2 and
> Final so you can update just those few changes.
>
> Thanks,
> Andrew
>
>



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