[Owasp-leaders] https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Credential_stuffing

Michael Coates michael.coates at owasp.org
Tue Sep 20 23:14:17 UTC 2016


"For example, lets say that multi-step login caused 90% of the current
Credential Stuffing attacks to go away, wouldn't that be worth it?"

I think we need to be very careful because, without data, we're just
speculating on how easy it is to bypass a "basic defense". For
consideration a comparable example would be to strip <script> in order to
prevent XSS attacks. It may prevent X% of basic XSS attacks, but we all
agree it's counterproductive to even suggest this.

Another example for consideration is multi-submit CSRF attacks. Would we
consider a two page form a recommended defense against CSRF attacks? It is
slightly more difficult, but not really.

Lastly, the economics of the attacker market does not require every
attacker to recreate the offensive attack wheel. Instead one attacker
builds a tool and resells it to many. This is particularly true with
credential stuffing attacks see Sentry MBA tool (
http://www.csoonline.com/article/3045247/cyber-attacks-espionage/sentry-mba-makes-credential-stuffing-attacks-easy-and-cheap.html).
At the end the inclusion of an easy to bypass defense would just lead to a
false sense of security.

What to do?

Recognize this is hard and have a factual discussion that outlines the good
defenses (even if they are hard). There are several that are good defenses
already included in the cheat sheet. Hopefully the collective focus with a
solid understanding of the problem space will lead to additional research
and easier defenses.

Thanks! I'm well aware this is a tough area and excited to see an
exploration of the issue.


--
Michael Coates | @_mwc <https://twitter.com/intent/user?screen_name=_mwc>
OWASP Global Board





On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 10:56 AM, Dave Wichers <dave.wichers at owasp.org>
wrote:

> Michael,
>
> I'm not so sure we should drop basic defenses yet, since this problem is
> so new. I think we should be VERY clear, that we understand certain
> defenses can be bypassed when they can.
>
> For example, lets say that multi-step login caused 90% of the current
> Credential Stuffing attacks to go away, wouldn't that be worth it? We all
> understand this is an arms race, so it will keep getting harder and harder,
> but I don't think that relatively simple defenses that work today should be
> discarded. And if that's simply step 1 in your defense, and you plan to add
> additional layers of defense, then I don't think discarding step 1 is
> necessary/appropriate.
>
> -Dave
>
> On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 1:46 PM, Michael Coates <michael.coates at owasp.org>
> wrote:
>
>> Brad,
>>
>> Thanks for kickstarting this cheat sheet. My initial feedback is that we
>> should scrap 3.2 Defense Option 2: Multi-Step Login Process and 3.3 Defense
>> Option 3: IP blacklists. These defenses just don't work against this type
>> of attack. Even if they provide some defense against the most basic attacks
>> I feel it's misleading since it's trivial for an attacker to bypass these
>> defenses and real world attacks show that they regularly do.
>>
>> Not meant as a bash on the overall cheat sheet. In fact I think I kicked
>> off this thread and am a big supporter of discussion here. But I think it's
>> good for us to avoid partial solutions that could give a false sense of
>> security.
>>
>> I like the other defenses. I think we also can add a few others which are
>> "additional identify verification" and "anti automation.
>>
>>
>> --
>> Michael Coates | @_mwc <https://twitter.com/intent/user?screen_name=_mwc>
>> OWASP Global Board
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 9:39 AM, Brad Causey <bradcausey at owasp.org>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Great discussion so far.
>>>
>>> Would you folks mind taking a look over this and providing feedback?
>>>
>>> I intend to provide more detail on each subject, but first I figured we
>>> could agree on the primary defenses.
>>>
>>> https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Credential_Stuffing_Preventi
>>> on_Cheat_Sheet
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OWASP-Leaders mailing list
>>> OWASP-Leaders at lists.owasp.org
>>> https://lists.owasp.org/mailman/listinfo/owasp-leaders
>>>
>>>
>>
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>
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