sriram.shyam at owasp.org
Mon Sep 19 02:59:44 UTC 2016
May be you can try white listing a range of IP's by looking the last three
logins. But, most of the devices are using static IP, it's not literally
possible in most of the cases.So, we can create a profile page sort of
thing in which weshould register our "device".
Like a list of devices, for egs: mobile: IMEI, computer: MAC.
It's a quite complex thingy but I believe that's the only thing which would
On Monday, September 19, 2016, Aurelijus Stanislovaitis <
aurelijus.stanislovaitis at owasp.org> wrote:
> if we are supposed to prevent mass login attempts then from technical
> point of view this not much different than password brute-force attack.
> CSRF is not suitable for this purpose at all, because it does not prevent
> automated login. Attacker is free to get the login page along with all
> tokens before submitting username+pwd. It may only slow down the rate of
> login attempts slightly, if that matters.
> The same can be said about 2 step login process (if still one factor).
> Adding steps does not prevent form automated login.
> Device fingerprinting + historical data intrigues and might be a part of a
> solution. Details of implementation are the most important. Does it block
> login attempts from unseen devices? Or maybe it does it prevent multiple
> logins from the same fingerprint? How fingerprint is calculated, etc.
> I'm not convinced that captha's are useless at all. Yes, bypasses exist,
> but is there any research proving that that captcha is fundamentally broken?
> 2FA sounds like an ultimate solution anyway.
> Alternatively might be worthy to look into the root cause of this -
> password reusing. How to fix this?
> On Sat, Sep 17, 2016 at 1:39 AM, Brad Causey <bradcausey at owasp.org
>> Hey Dave!
>> We've been using basic CSRF protection with a two step login process. It
>> basically prevents automated logins.
>> Of course, that doesn't stop the attacker from manually logging in, or
>> scripting a browser.
>> For that, we use device fingerprinting and historical data.
>> "Si vis pacem, para bellum"
>> On Fri, Sep 16, 2016 at 10:08 AM, Dave Wichers <dave.wichers at owasp.org
>>> I'm glad to see this article already exists. What I'd love to see next
>>> is recommended techniques to defend against this type of attack. I know
>>> that such defenses are really hard as this is a complex subject.
>>> For example, adding CAPTCHAs just pisses off users and doesn't work
>>> Requiring two factor authentication helps, but makes the site harder to
>>> use. And even if you require 2 factor, like the banks do with their
>>> username/password (factor 1) then Q/A or saved token (factor 2), they put
>>> the normal username/password as step 1, so credential stuffing attacks can
>>> still be done, and if there is a match, then the attacker can try to guess
>>> the Q/A answer, or spear fish the victim (esp. if the username is their
>>> email address, which hopefully its not), etc.
>>> Requiring 'real' 2 factor, like sending a pin to the user's mobile phone
>>> is far better, but how many sites even provide that as an option, nevermind
>>> require it. And I think its even harder for mobile apps as usability for
>>> them is even more critical than traditional web apps.
>>> Never allowing the username to be the customer's (victim's) email
>>> address would help reduce the likelihood of an account name match from one
>>> system to another AND help prevent the attacker from spear fishing the
>>> victim (because the victim's actually email address wouldn't be obvious).
>>> So that's one thing we could recommend.
>>> Anyway. This is a complex topic and worthy of discussion. It would be
>>> awesome if we could come up with a Credential Stuffing Prevention Cheat
>>> Sheet with whatever good ideas we agree would make it harder, and also
>>> clearly document the techniques that don't work at all (like use of
>>> Has anyone thought really hard about this and wants to discuss? I've
>>> only been thinking about it for a couple of days.
>>> OWASP-Leaders mailing list
>>> OWASP-Leaders at lists.owasp.org
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