[Owasp-leaders] Instead of OWASP libraries, why don't we ...

Tim tim.morgan at owasp.org
Sat Nov 21 21:16:56 UTC 2015


Jim: you nailed it.  As you say, "built in" and "by default" are the
key goals.

Off-the-shelf third-party libraries that provide good security
features (when you turn them on) are certainly necessary, but this
misses the target audience I'm talking about.

We need to fix the APIs developers are already using, and in
particular we need to fix the APIs that a typical novice developer
will try first.  If .NET provides a class to do X, then that's
probably the first place a .NET developer will look (and examples on
how to use it on random discussion boards) unless there's a good
reason not to.

Why go through the trouble of learning a third-party library in
addition to the language you're just now getting the hang of?  Of
course there are reasons to do it, but remember, you're a novice
developer.


Responding to Kevin:

> >Agree with that. Writing good general security class libraries / APIs
> >that developers
> >find easy to use in widely different contexts that you can't completely
> >foresee is extremely difficult. It requires both significant development and
> >security experience relatively few have.

I agree that, in the general case, we can't anticipate how all
developers are going to use a given API.  But that isn't the point.
We're after the common case, since the simple, common case is the one
that can generates so many bugs.  Then we spend a decade trying to
track down every last one of those bugs that could have been easily
avoided.  Let's start by eliminating the common case mistakes and then
spend our time working on more clever corner cases.


> >I could say the same thing for Struts validation. I very seldom see it used.

Ugg... Struts.  Yeah, don't use that.  Don't have time to justify it
here, but Struts should be avoided if security is a concern at all.
They took a useful platform and then introduced a bunch of RCE bugs.
And they still haven't addressed the root problem with those RCEs,
AFAIK.


> >copying are insecure. So I don't really know how to combat that. Maybe
> >rather than OWASP funding developers to work on security libraries, we
> >should hire security conscious developers to patrol development forums,
> >newsgroups, etc. and correct posts where examples are given that have
> >security vulnerabilities.

I agree that is an outstanding problem.  Hopefully if a platform's
core APIs and documentation steer most developers down a secure path,
then those making bad recommendations today on forums will start
making better recommendations later....   But the issue certainly
won't go away any time soon.

tim


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