[Owasp-leaders] [Owasp-community] [Owasp-topten] OT10 Risks?

Eoin Keary eoin.keary at owasp.org
Mon Sep 29 21:35:03 UTC 2014


Hey,
My final email on this subject as I suspect many people are tired of this thread (including me).

Success: yes top 10 has more than any project promoted appsec awareness. It has promoted such that if all apps covered the items listed in the top 10 the global Internet would be more secure. It's easy to consume, understand and focus on insecurity point-by-point. It is simply a very effective awareness document. Kudos to Dave and Jeff Williams.

Purpose: awareness. It promotes awareness. Simple. It works. Regardless of intellectual constructs, points of view, academic malarkey, it simply works. Why complicate things.
Engineering is about simplicity not complexity.

Has the top 10 changed in any major way since its inception? No. 
Why? We are still developing crap code . Our industry grows and grows but nothing changes. Like the "war on drugs". Root cause is what needs to be addressed. 

Eoin Keary
Owasp Global Board
+353 87 977 2988


On 29 Sep 2014, at 22:09, "Timur 'x' Khrotko (owasp)" <timur at owasp.org> wrote:

> "Does the top 10 work? Yes. ... Does the OWASP top 10 serve its purpose? Sure."
> 
> Eoin, could you please explain, what you mean by (a) its successful working and (b) its purpose?!  
> 
> 
> On Mon, Sep 29, 2014 at 10:31 PM, Eoin Keary <eoin.keary at owasp.org> wrote:
>> So Dave Wichers explanation was succinct and worked. What's wrong with looking at the Top 10 from that standpoint?
>> The top 10 also needs to be accessible for non security folks (the point of owasp awareness). Getting dragged into semantics and nomenclature is pointless if the only people who give a toss are owasp members. Does the top 10 work? Yes. Does the average developer give a toss about naming? No. Does the OWASP top 10 serve its purpose? Sure. 
>> 
>> 
>> Eoin Keary
>> Owasp Global Board
>> +353 87 977 2988
>> 
>> 
>> On 24 Sep 2014, at 08:30, Simone Onofri <simone.onofri at gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> Dear Jim,
>>> 
>>> Literally speaking it is correct e.g. a SQL Injection is not a Risk as by definition, but in the latests editions of TOP 10 are getting into some analysis like Risk Analysis of most frequent "issues" on Web Application Security (I am using issues as a generic term) and I think with a little edits can became also "correct" by definition.
>>> 
>>> Let me explain with two examples with the most generic defintion of Risk that can be taken from M_o_R / ISO 31000 and ISO 27000:
>>>  - M_o_R [1]: "An uncertain event or set of events that, should it occur, will have an effect on the achievement of objectives. A risk is measured by a combination of the probability of a perceived threat or opportunity occurring and the magnitude of its impact on objectives. " We can remap on our context is something like "An uncertain event that, should occur, will have an effect on the achievement of IT Security objectives". An important concept in this definition is that it is not bad. It depends. If the effect is positive we can call it an opportunity (but it is not the case of our TOP 10), if the effect is negative is it also called a threat in M_o_R.
>>>  - ISO 27000 [2]: "effect of uncertainty on objective" in which effect it is a deviation (positive or negative) and generating an impact but we are not sure that the event which actualise the risk. how it is possible to actualise a risk? if the asset (something that has a value for the organization) or a control (a measure we can use to modify the risk) has a vulnerability, which is a weakness that can be exploited by threats (is the potential cause) during an attack (the attempt to destroy, expose, alter, disable, steal or gain unauthorized access to or make unauthorized use of an asset) by someone or something.
>>> 
>>> In particular in 27000 definition I see more concepts and analysis on latest TOP 10 version. Taking an example of Injection [3], with a specific example of a SQL Injection, as described:
>>> 
>>> We have some assets (e.g. the application, the database, the data into database) and if we have some weaknesses ( read "Security Weaknesses" - e.g. no or poor input validation, poor written code with inline sql queries and not prepared statements), someone or something (read "Threat Agent"), causing a specific Impact (and I love the separation of Technical and Business impact in TOP 10).
>>> 
>>> And the section "How Do I Prevent 'Injection'?" sounds like "which kind of Controls" I can use to protect.
>>> 
>>> TOP 10 talks about the Analysis of most common Risks that can occur with the most frequent weaknesses/vulnerabilities, talking in ISO language.
>>> 
>>> My two cents,
>>> 
>>> Simone
>>> 
>>> [1] https://www.exin.com/assets/exin/frameworks/126/glossaries/english_glossary_of_terms_mor_201404.pdf
>>> [2] http://standards.iso.org/ittf/licence.html
>>> [3] https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2013-A1-Injection
>>> 
>>> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 10:40 PM, Jim Manico <jim.manico at owasp.org> wrote:
>>>> Aloha Community and Leaders,
>>>> 
>>>> During the many hallway conversations had at AppSec USA in Denver,
>>>> AppSec nomenclature came up on a number of occasions. I heard several
>>>> folks claim that the "OWASP Top Ten •Risks•" was mis-named and that
>>>> the list is not really risks.
>>>> 
>>>> Is this a fair perspective? What should it be?
>>>> 
>>>> I am uncertain of this myself and am asking to trigger a intelligent
>>>> conversation; I in no way wish to harm the many volunteers who have
>>>> made the various OT10 lists happen.
>>>> 
>>>> Thoughts?
>>>> 
>>>> Aloha,
>>>> --
>>>> Jim Manico
>>>> @Manicode
>>>> (808) 652-3805
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> Owasp-topten mailing list
>>>> Owasp-topten at lists.owasp.org
>>>> https://lists.owasp.org/mailman/listinfo/owasp-topten
>>> 
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>>> Owasp-community at lists.owasp.org
>>> https://lists.owasp.org/mailman/listinfo/owasp-community
>> 
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