[Owasp-leaders] OWASP Mobile Top Ten 2014 - M10 Datapoints

Jonathan Carter jonathan.carter at owasp.org
Wed Nov 5 12:09:19 UTC 2014


I fully encourage people that have opinions to come forward. What I don't
encourage is people trying to make bold statements without all the facts.

On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 4:07 AM, psiinon <psiinon at gmail.com> wrote:

> Jonathon,
>
> I think thats out of order :(
> You should be able to make valid arguments for or against points of view
> without resorting to personal attacks like this.
> Putting forward your opinion is not making things personal, and
> criticizing people for doing so can discourage other people from taking
> part in the debate.
> Please stop this line of reasoning.
>
> Simon
>
> On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 12:01 PM, Jonathan Carter <
> jonathan.carter at owasp.org> wrote:
>
>> I think you've made this personal by trying to impose your view of the
>> world on a technical space you really don't specialize in. My 2 cents...
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 3:58 AM, Jim Manico <jim.manico at owasp.org> wrote:
>>
>>> I politely suggest you stick to the debate and move this to the mobile
>>> list. No need to make this personal, it's not my intention, Jonathan, and I
>>> hope it's not yours either.
>>>
>>> --
>>> Jim Manico
>>> @Manicode
>>> (808) 652-3805
>>>
>>> On Nov 5, 2014, at 7:55 PM, Jonathan Carter <jonathan.carter at owasp.org>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> With all due respect, you are a web guy and not a mobile guy.
>>>
>>> On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 3:53 AM, Jim Manico <jim.manico at owasp.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>> So an attacker who is savvy enough to distribute custom modified mobile
>>>> apps and who knows how to surgically identify pinned certs and change them
>>>> can't get around obfuscation? I disagree with this threat model, I submit
>>>> with respect.
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Jim Manico
>>>> @Manicode
>>>> (808) 652-3805
>>>>
>>>> On Nov 5, 2014, at 7:50 PM, Jonathan Carter <jonathan.carter at owasp.org>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> The attacker is downloading the app, making the mods to their own
>>>> version of the app, and then distributing that to the victim.
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 3:48 AM, Jim Manico <jim.manico at owasp.org>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> What I'm hearing is....
>>>>>
>>>>> 1) You can modify •your own• mobile binary
>>>>> 2) Change •your own• pinned cert
>>>>> 3) And then man in the middle yourself (by making a forged certificate
>>>>> signed by a real authority?)
>>>>>
>>>>> I do not see this as a real risk.
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> Jim Manico
>>>>> @Manicode
>>>>> (808) 652-3805
>>>>>
>>>>> On Nov 5, 2014, at 7:41 PM, Erwin Geirnaert <
>>>>> erwin.geirnaert at zionsecurity.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>  Hi Jim,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> If we can execute a man-in-the-middle during black-box mobile app
>>>>> security testing, we often find more issues and attack vectors.
>>>>>
>>>>> Man-in-the-middle is for mobile a real problem.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Best regards,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Erwin
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *From:* Jim Manico [mailto:jim.manico at owasp.org <jim.manico at owasp.org>]
>>>>>
>>>>> *Sent:* 05 November 2014 11:38
>>>>> *To:* Erwin Geirnaert; Jonathan Carter
>>>>> *Cc:* OWASP Leaders
>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [Owasp-leaders] OWASP Mobile Top Ten 2014 - M10
>>>>> Datapoints
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I do not see *self* man-in-the-middle as a serious risk.
>>>>>
>>>>> Now if the attacker can modify the mobile app of a victim and change
>>>>> the pinned cert of other clients, that is a big deal. But my understanding
>>>>> is that is not the scenario Jonathan was referring to, if so please
>>>>> elaborate how that would work...
>>>>>
>>>>> Again, a pinned cert is NOT private data. It's a *public* cert signed
>>>>> by an authority. (Or a hash of a signed public cert like the experimental
>>>>> IETF headers for browsers :
>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning/)
>>>>>
>>>>> Aloha,
>>>>> Jim
>>>>>
>>>>>  On 11/5/14 5:28 PM, Erwin Geirnaert wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Man-in-the-middle
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *From:* owasp-leaders-bounces at lists.owasp.org [
>>>>> mailto:owasp-leaders-bounces at lists.owasp.org
>>>>> <owasp-leaders-bounces at lists.owasp.org>] *On Behalf Of *Jim Manico
>>>>> *Sent:* 05 November 2014 10:15
>>>>> *To:* Jonathan Carter
>>>>> *Cc:* OWASP Leaders
>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [Owasp-leaders] OWASP Mobile Top Ten 2014 - M10
>>>>> Datapoints
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> So, if the attacker modifies their own pinned certificate in a mobile
>>>>> app, what do they accomplish? The inability to use that webservice. What is
>>>>> accomplished from a security point of view? Nothing....
>>>>>
>>>>> - Jim
>>>>>
>>>>> On 11/5/14 4:38 PM, Jonathan Carter wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>  In that particular case, the attacker will perform static analysis,
>>>>> identify the sensitive code associated with the hardcoded data, and then
>>>>> modify the actual data values.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Nov 4, 2014 at 11:41 PM, Jim Manico <jim.manico at owasp.org>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>  Certificate pinning does hard-code •secrets•, it hard-codes the
>>>>> •public• SSL/TLS key. This is a significant difference, Jonathan.
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>>
>>>>> Jim Manico
>>>>>
>>>>> @Manicode
>>>>>
>>>>> (808) 652-3805
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Nov 5, 2014, at 11:38 AM, Jonathan Carter <
>>>>> jonathan.carter at owasp.org> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>  While M10 does touch on digital rights management, it goes far
>>>>> beyond that.  Here's an easy example: certificate pinning.  Certificate
>>>>> pinning is a classic coding technique that relies upon hardcoded data.
>>>>> This security control has an inherent set of other related binary
>>>>> vulnerabilities that would allow an attacker to completely bypass or
>>>>> disable your flawlessly written code.  You must make it as difficult as
>>>>> possible to prevent someone from modifying that hardocded data.  If they
>>>>> do, you've completely made your certificate pinning control irrelevant.
>>>>> This is what M10 is touching on and it's something that OWASP really
>>>>> doesn't like to talk about or acknowledge.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Nov 4, 2014 at 7:12 PM, Tim <tim.morgan at owasp.org> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Leaders,
>>>>>
>>>>> I have brought up my concerns about M10 before and I have done a fair
>>>>> bit of thinking about this since then.  I think it would be useful to
>>>>> re-frame the discussion with some more subtle distinctions:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 0. Are all software security risks also considered business risks?
>>>>>
>>>>>    Yes, I would say so.  It is hard to find a computer security risk
>>>>>    that doesn't pose some kind of business risk.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 1. Are all business risks considered security risks?
>>>>>
>>>>>    No, I definitely don't think so.  There are plenty of things
>>>>>    outside of the realm of software security that are very real
>>>>>    business risks (e.g. employees running over a business partner in
>>>>>    the parking lot by accident).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 2. Is binary modification/repackaging a real business risk to
>>>>>    intellectual property?
>>>>>
>>>>>    Yes!  It is happening already.  An attacker could repackage your
>>>>>    app, redistribute, and reap benefits from app stores based on your
>>>>>    hard work.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 3. How is mobile reverse engineering and/or repackaging a security
>>>>>    risk?
>>>>>
>>>>>    Yes, specifically:
>>>>>
>>>>>    A) Reverse engineering can expose crypto keys and any other secrets
>>>>>       that are foolishly embedded in the app.
>>>>>
>>>>>    B) Repackaging can be used to try and fool users into installing
>>>>>       the wrong version of an application which has malicious intent.
>>>>>       Very similar to phishing.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 4. Does mobile app obfuscation/monitoring/anti-reverse engineering
>>>>>    technology help solve a *business* risk?
>>>>>
>>>>>    Yes, in that it raises the cost of reusing the compiled version of
>>>>>    the software.  Raise the cost enough, and the attacker might as
>>>>>    well write their own app.  Even if you don't raise the cost *that*
>>>>>    high, you reduce the number of people willing to target your app
>>>>>    specifically.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 5. Does mobile app obfuscation/monitoring/anti-reverse engineering
>>>>>    technology help solve a *security* risk?
>>>>>
>>>>>    No, I don't think so.
>>>>>
>>>>>    Regarding (3A)-- If crypto keys/credentials/etc are valuable, it
>>>>>    doesn't take a whole lot of effort decode an obfuscated binary to
>>>>>    get that them.  Definitely worth the minimal effort.
>>>>>
>>>>>    Regarding (3B)-- If cloning apps like this is effective against
>>>>>    users, then it's just as easy to copy the images from the company's
>>>>>    website, slap it on a "hello world" app, add a login form, and
>>>>>    poof: you have users' credentials.  You don't need to clone a whole
>>>>>    app to fool users.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I think many folks on each side of the discussion are correct in what
>>>>> they are saying, but they are talking about different things.  Look at
>>>>> the issue with a slightly higher resolution, particularly in the
>>>>> context of what attacks are actually applicable, and it all becomes
>>>>> much more clear:  Remove M10.  (After all, OWASP is primarily about
>>>>> computer security, not digital rights management.)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>> tim
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>   _______________________________________________
>>>>> OWASP-Leaders mailing list
>>>>> OWASP-Leaders at lists.owasp.org
>>>>> https://lists.owasp.org/mailman/listinfo/owasp-leaders
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
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>> OWASP-Leaders at lists.owasp.org
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>>
>>
>
>
> --
> OWASP ZAP <https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ZAP> Project leader
>
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