[Owasp-leaders] Zone transfer

Peter Perfetti peter.perfetti at owasp.org
Fri Apr 9 12:58:56 EDT 2010


My $.02:

Zone transfers are restricted to prevent unauthorized disclosure of internal
machines and network enumeration.

The fact that no one knows of a past compromise is irrelevant. It is a
potential point of exploitation. Just because you don't know about a past
breach doesn't mean it hasn't occurred.

Perhaps there is nothing sensitive in there now, but can anyone guarantee
that no sensitive information will ever be present?

If a service provider "feels" then perhaps they're not "thinking".
Restricting zone transfers is considered "best practice" for a reason. I
usually include DNS in risk assessments and pen tests, and try to exploit
them and whatever information I find whenever possible.

There is also the reputational aspect that a security-centric organization
does not follow network and system best security practice when we preach our
own standards.

I'd be happy to weigh in more on service provider criteria and oversight if
anyone wishes.

-
Pete


-
Peter Perfetti
Chapter Leader
NY/NJ Metro Chapter
OWASP
peter.perfetti at owasp.org
-


On Fri, Apr 9, 2010 at 9:18 AM, Laurence Casey <larry.casey at owasp.org>wrote:

>  Ralph,
>
>
>
> I have tried working with my current DNS provider on this issue without
> success. They feel this is not a security risk. The risk is when people use
> DNS for security reasons. As you can see yourself if you do a zone transfer
> that nothing is private or used for security. You also mention zone
> transfers without authentication? Who should be granted this authenticated
> access? If I had security related information in our records, I would
> certainly questions everything about OWASP’s infrastructure. I use a third
> party DNS provider who happens to also be a major hosting company and has
> nothing to do with our servers. Also note, that I have been using this same
> DNS provider for 10+ years. In those 10+ years, how many times has OWASP
> been attacked using this zone transfer? What exploits have been the result?
>
>
>
> If somebody on the forum would like to offer a DNS server that does not
> allow zone transfers, I will be more than happy to transfer all the OWASP
> domain names to them.
>
>
>
> --Larry
>
>
>
> *From:* owasp-leaders-bounces at lists.owasp.org [mailto:
> owasp-leaders-bounces at lists.owasp.org] *On Behalf Of *Ralph Durkee
> *Sent:* Thursday, April 08, 2010 9:03 AM
> *To:* owasp-leaders at lists.owasp.org
> *Subject:* Re: [Owasp-leaders] Zone transfer
>
>
>
> It doesn't make sense for OWASP to use a DNS server that allows zone
> transfers without authentication. This is one of the basics in terms of DNS
> security.
> It's not the kind of open that should be OWASP.   If the name servers fail
> in this are there other issues?  We shouldn't we ask about the security and
> then get permission for a test? Most of what we do depends on DNS being
> trusted.
>
>  -- Ralph Durkee, CISSP, GSEC, GCIH, GSNA, GPEN
>
> Rochester OWASP
>
>
>
>
>
> Rory McCune wrote:
>
> On Thu, Apr 8, 2010 at 9:49 AM, OWASP Geneva Chapter
>
> <antonio.fontes at owasp.org> <antonio.fontes at owasp.org> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 8 April 2010 09:00, Erlend Oftedal <Erlend.Oftedal at bekk.no> <Erlend.Oftedal at bekk.no> wrote:
>
>
>
> Hi
>
> I see this message popping up from time to time on twitter, that owasp.org
>
> is vulnerable to zone transfer.
>
> I guess that’s something we want to fix.
>
> “RT @maxisoler: +1 WTF?! RT: @Jabra: Wtf owasp.org is still vulnerable to
>
> zone transfer!”
>
> Erlend
>
>
>
> Hi Leaders,
>
>
>
> The initial security requirement dictates that zone content disclosure
>
> should be restricted in order to reduce the risk of hidden/internal
>
> hosts disclosure (which we could even argue it's a "security by
>
> obfuscation" practice).
>
>
>
> Keeping it open might also mean we did our work correctly, applied
>
> basic risk assessment, and stick to our "openness" principle.
>
>
>
> (okay okay, devil's advocate now heading towards the exit door)
>
>
>
> Antonio
>
>
>
>
>
> I'd agree in that there shouldn't be "private" information available
>
> in public DNS as there are other ways (eg, DNS brute-force) to get
>
> access to that kind of information.
>
>
>
> That said, from a PR perspective, it may not look good for us to have
>
> something present in our security posture which is generally
>
> considered a "bad thing", so probably worth changing...
>
>
>
> my 0.02 of local currency.
>
>
>
> cheers
>
>
>
> Rory
>
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>
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>
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>
>
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