[Owasp-delhi] SSL Broken..

Gunwant Singh gunwant.s at gmail.com
Thu Jan 22 12:36:54 EST 2009


Lava,

What do you think about the delay caused while intercepting and modifying
the traffic on the fly. As I pointed out earlier the time-stamp appended at
each end is validated at the other which is also based on the tolerace
calculated at the handshake time. This will compute the delay caused due to
manipulation of the traffic by MITM.

As I also said that based on the criticality factor the quantization can
vary in milliseconds even nanoseconds. Nonetheless the validation is
performed at both ends, so modifying traffic from either end to the other
will be detected and invalidated.

However, for me the question is how to code/implement the handshake process
which can be a bit complex. Infact, much complex.

-Gunwant.



On Thu, Jan 22, 2009 at 2:49 PM, <lavakumar.kuppan at rbs.com> wrote:

>
> Hi Gunwant,
>
> In addition to ARP poisoning this tool also lets you manipulate HTTP
> content on the fly.
> However coming back to the timestamp technique, here is how it will happen:
>
> STEP 1:
> Client  -> GET /index.jsp -> Server
> Server - > 200 OK <html>Secret_Msg="secret"<script src=timestamp.js></html>
> -> Attacker (notes down the secret message) -> Client (lets say timestamp.js
> contains the client-side logic for timestamp creation and hashing)
>
> STEP 2:
> Client -> GET /timestamp.js  -> Server
> Server  -> [timestamp();hash()] -> Attacker - > [timestamp();hash();
> (document.cookie = "password
> ="+document.forms['login'].password.value+"time"=time())] -> Client
> (The attacker who is sniffing with ARP poisoning is now manipulating the js
> file's content on the fly, he adds a couple of more lines of code to the
> actual js file which adds the user's password to the cookie under the name
> 'password' and the current time on the client under the name 'time'.)
>
> STEP 3:
> Client(user enters the password, the hash is created by the js and sent to
> the server, this request also contains the clear-text password and the
> current time in the cookie) -> Attacker (notes down the password and time
> and removes these fields from the cookie and sends to the server) ->
> Server(server happily authenticates the user)
>
>
> At this point the attacker has all the three values needed for the hash
> creation - current time on the client side, secret message and the user's
> password. He also knows how the hash is created.
> Now he can recreate the hash as many time as he wants with new timestamps.
> If the server issues a new secret message then the attacker can get that as
> he is sniffing, same goes for any session ID that is issued.
> It should be trivial to stay within the time-lag tolerance as for any site
> to not piss off its users the tolerance should atleast be in seconds.
> If it was in milliseconds then even the actual sites users cant send valid
> requests.
>
> If the attacker doesnt have a sense of adventure then he can stop once he
> gets the user's password ;)
>
> Hope this makes things clear
> .
> It would have been intresting to discuss this with you in person during
> this month's meet but unfortunately am not in Gurgoan anymore.
> Good luck with your presentation, am sure that everyone..developers esp
> would find it just as useful as the earlier two :)
>
> Thanks and Regards,
> Lavakumar K
> Penetration Tester - Global ISA
>
>
>
>  *Gunwant Singh <gunwant.s at gmail.com>*
>
> 01/21/2009 09:15 PM
>   To
> lavakumar.kuppan at rbs.com  cc
> owasp-delhi at lists.owasp.org  Subject
> Re: [Owasp-delhi] SSL Broken..
>
>
>
>
> Hi Lava,
>
> Come on! I know ARP poisoning, what I meant was how would you intercept and
> manipulate the traffic in my specific case, especially when you have
> time-stamps involved.
>
> Thanks.
> Gunwant
>
> P.S: Is this mail delivery system error only coming to me or everyone else?
>
> On Wed, Jan 21, 2009 at 11:39 AM, <*lavakumar.kuppan at rbs.com*<lavakumar.kuppan at rbs.com>>
> wrote:
>
> Hi Gunwant,
>
> You can check out ettercap, it has ARP poisoning capability and lets you
> manipulate the intercepted traffic on the fly with filters.
> Play around with it a little :)
>
> Thanks and Regards,
> Lavakumar K
> Penetration Tester - Global ISA
>
>
>   *"Gunwant Singh" <**gunwant.s at gmail.com* <gunwant.s at gmail.com>*>*
>
> 01/19/2009 11:25 PM
>
>   To
> *lavakumar.kuppan at rbs.com* <lavakumar.kuppan at rbs.com>  cc
> *owasp-delhi at lists.owasp.org* <owasp-delhi at lists.owasp.org>  Subject
> Re: [Owasp-delhi] SSL Broken..
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Hi Lava,
>
> Nice to see your reply. Please see my thoughts on your comments.
>
> >Now in the solution that you have suggested, the server has to fetch the
> user's password for each request which defeats the whole purpose of
> maintaning session IDs.
>
> Good point. My suggestion on this: Access the password only once and store
> it in a temporary variable securely for further transactions and then delete
> it as the session ends.
>
> >Ironically you had already suggested a solution and then asked the
> question, wonder if you were just checking if everyone understood your talk
> properly ;)
>
> If you would have read this mailing thread from the very scratch, you would
> have known that this question ain't related to salted MD5. I was not
> checking if people understood my talks properly. I could have done that
> there and then only.
>
> >For your salted-hashning technique or the new techique there is to be a
> lot of client side JS code which has to create the salted hash and send it
> to the server. The attacker would just intercept this message and replace
> your JS with another JS which does every thing like the original JS but in
> addition steals the user's clear text password and appends to the request
> which the attacker can now get by viewing your request.
>
> I would like to comment about the salted hashing part in a different e-mail
> (if I get some time) as this topic is not what I am talking about here.
> About the technique, in case if you can manipulate the generated hash
> somehow by intercepting, and make up your own hash, can you still be a part
> of the same session. I don't think so. Let me know if you can. Check out the
> way I told about its workings.
>
> Could you come up with some *PoC* to what you said? You said intercepting
> and manipulating the traffic on the fly travelling from the server to the
> client or the other way around? How would you do that sitting somewhere on
> the network? I am curious to know.
>
> I don't know why you guys keep involving SSL with this thing.
>
> Thanks for your feedback.
>
> -Gunwant
>
> On Mon, Jan 19, 2009 at 1:04 PM, <*lavakumar.kuppan at rbs.com*<lavakumar.kuppan at rbs.com>>
> wrote:
>
> Hi Gunwant,
>
> Thanks for bringing up this topic, can see that it has tickled quite a few
> brains in the list already ;), prompting some really intelligent ideas and
> arguments.
> I was on vacations and missed out on all the fun here, but its never too
> late so here is my humble opinion.
>
> There are two very important factors that have to be considered here:
>
> 1) Why is a session ID required.
> 2) What is the possibilty of some one with sniffing capability to intercept
> and manipulate the traffic.
>
>
> 1) Why is a session ID required
> I believe sessiond IDs are used to avoid connecting to the DB each time and
> validating the user's password, they are used to improve efficiency.
> Now in the solution that you have suggested, the server has to fetch the
> user's password for each request which defeats the whole purpose of
> maintaning session IDs.
> Since we are anyway reffering to the password for each request, I would
> like to think that we can authenticate for each request with the salted-hash
> technique you suggested in your december OWASP talk, provided once a salt is
> used the server discards it and issues a new one.
> Ironically you had already suggested a solution and then asked the
> question, wonder if you were just checking if everyone understood your talk
> properly ;)
>
> 2) What is the possibilty of some one with sniffing capability to intercept
> and manipulate the traffic.
> As someone who has done quite a bit of sniffing on customer networks during
> pentests, I think that someone who is capable of sniffing would in all
> probability also be capable of intercepting and manipulating the traffic
> between the client and server. There might be exceptions but they would be
> uncommon.
> Any techniquie which enforces some trust on the client-side logic now gets
> defeated.
> For your salted-hashning technique or the new techique there is to be a lot
> of client side JS code which has to create the salted hash and send it to
> the server. The attacker would just intercept this message and replace your
> JS with another JS which does every thing like the original JS but in
> addition steals the user's clear text password and appends to the request
> which the attacker can now get by viewing your request.
> Once this happens the entitre security system is defeated as its so closely
> attached to the user's password.
> So in my opinion once someone is able to intercept a clear-text traffic he
> could directly or indirectly bypass most restictions enforced.
>
> The thing that differentiates SSL from the suggested approach is the use of
> Server certificates which establishes authenticity, unless we can figure out
> a way to do that our confidentiality and integrity solutions might fail.
>
> Dont cosider thick client approach like java applets as reverse engineering
> is a possibility.
>
> PS: OK, I have not suggested any solution,  am a pentester what do you
> expect :P
>
> Thanks and Regards,
> Lavakumar K
> Penetration Tester - Global ISA
>   *"Gunwant Singh" <**gunwant.s at gmail.com* <gunwant.s at gmail.com>*>*
> Sent by: *owasp-delhi-bounces at lists.owasp.org*<owasp-delhi-bounces at lists.owasp.org>
>
> 01/16/2009 11:06 PM
>
>   To
> *owasp-delhi at lists.owasp.org* <owasp-delhi at lists.owasp.org>  cc
>   Subject
> Re: [Owasp-delhi] SSL Broken..
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Hi,
>
> Ok, let me elucidate the workings of the technique I was talking about.
>
>
>
> But before that I just want to shed some light on a few things so no-one
> comes again questioning to me about these and start some endless argument.
>
> - The e-commerce site I was talking about, I never said that they are only
> using the technique I am going to discuss. They might be using other
> techniques for their protection. What I meant was I've not seen/heard anyone
> else using this technique. That doesn't mean that they are only using this
> technique for their protection. Every giant incorporates multi-tier security
> for their resources.  I am not sure what exactly they are using besides this
> technique as Nobody reveals that.  I questioned someone on a forum, he came
> up with this technique, I studied, checked this on their documentation page,
> discussed with some people, discussed with some more, argued with even more
> and now I am here. I am looking for some feedback from you all. Just let me
> know what ever you think is wrong with this. Anyhow the question is not that
> whether they are using it or not but the question is 'How good is the
> technique?'
>
> - Please don't misinterpret my statement. I am not saying 'Don't use SSL'.
> SSL is definitely a protection mechanism for "Now" if we use it
> appropriately (CA signed certificate with a well-tested, well-reviewed
> implementation). Use SSL till someone finds some exploit *practically* not
> theoretically. This whole discussion is based on a research question so I/we
> can get a *feasible* working solution for this (may-be-a-future) problem. If
> you are not interested in discussing please do not comment. And please do
> not envisage what I am not saying.
>
> So here is how it works.
>
> No SSL. All traffic in clear text.
> Initially we need to communicate an OOB password/code/nonce (whatever you
> call it) to the client - only *once* not each time.
>
>
> 1. The client initiates a connection request to the server. As a result,
> server will initiate a handshake process to synchronize the time-stamps
> between the client and itself. Then the server will analyze tolerance time
> of packets leaving the client workstation till it reaches the server. The
> tolerance time is configured so to manage slow hosts or slow traffic. In
> plain words, server synchronizes date and time (in seconds, milliseconds or
> even nanoseconds based on the criticality of the application) with the
> client.
>
> 2. At the client side: the message, instantaneous time-stamp and the
> password are concatenated and hashed via SHA-1/SHA-256, whatever one wishes.
> This ensuing hash is combined with the username to form an authentication
> header and sent to the server.
>
> 3. At the server side, the server sees the username and perceives which
> user is trying to authenticate. Based on the tolerance configured initially
> at the handshake time, it picks the time-stamp from its own clock and using
> the password and the message it generates the hash in the same way as it was
> done at the client side.
>
> 4. If the hash matches it generates a Session ID and maps it to the
> username of the user. This Session ID will be sent from the client to the
> server along with the computed hash (which is different for each request -
> see next Step)
>
> 5. Now if the client sends another request, it appends and then hashes the
> message, password and the time-stamp (which will be apparently because of
> the different instantaneous time-stamp i.e. date and time). This resulting
> string is sent to the server along with the Session ID assigned to the user
> earlier. The resulting string contains a different hash as the time has
> changed. This will be validated at the server the same way as in Step 3.
>
> Now how can an adversary exploit this scenario? What I think of are two
> ways:
>
> 1. Either he will capture one of the hashes and try to predict the next
> hash by brute forcing different time-stamps.
>
> - But this can not be possible. He doesn't have the password to generate
> the hash.
>
> 2. What if he captures a series of requests and responses and replays them
> back to the server at a later stage.
>
> - This can't be possible either. In order to interact with the server, one
> needs to handshake so to synchronize itself with the server's clock. The
> attacker would not be able to synchronize because he would not be able to
> synchronize the *past-timestamp* (in the captured traffic) with the server's
> current time.
>
> 3. Lastly for the newbies, what if he captures the Session ID.
>
> - But he would not be able to produce the matching Hash for the request, so
> no luck.
>
> A few things to contemplate:
>
> 1. This will be considerably be CPU intensive but can be acknowledged if
> compared to the processing cycles SSL takes.
>
> 2. Time synchronization can be complex. I have no idea how to do that.
>
> 3. Please provide your
> feedback/fury/antagonism/annoyance/appreciation/whatever. Hope I explained
> this in a very straightforward way.
>
> Thanks.
>
> Gunwant
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Jan 16, 2009 at 4:26 AM, Plash Chowdhary <*plash.chowdhary at tcs.com
> * <plash.chowdhary at tcs.com>> wrote:
>
> Gunwant,
>
> I will be interested to know kind of soltutions are being used.
> SInce you are talking about **Time stamp**(in clear text will be
> perdictable, specially if a client side algo is being used) <some random
> number in hidden field with every request,<unique captcha with every request
> (this will be interesting)  can be a case but they will be not as roboust
>  as out of band..
> some how with Time stamps only thing that rings bell is CRYPTOGRAPHY *: D
> *(PKI??)
>
> I will be really surprized if that organization is not using SSL from a
> Vendor. (as you said its an e commerce site)
>
> and anyways i wont be using HTTPS on public content of my site and will
> switch to HTTPS session only when needed (IDEALLY)
>
>
> lemme know your thoughts
>
> Regards
> Plash
>
>
>   *"Gunwant Singh" <**gunwant.s at gmail.com* <gunwant.s at gmail.com>*>*
>
> 01/15/2009 12:30 PM
>
>   To
> "Plash Chowdhary" <*plash.chowdhary at tcs.com* <plash.chowdhary at tcs.com>>
> cc
> *owasp-delhi at lists.owasp.org* <owasp-delhi at lists.owasp.org>  Subject
> Re: [Owasp-delhi] SSL Broken..
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Plash,
>
> Thanks for the idea. Please don't take my talks as overstatements, I just
> wanted to have some innovative ideas from you guys.
>
> Many organizations implement session mechanisms without using SSL. As a
> matter of fact these are not the conditions that I have set. There are many
> scenarios where using SSL is unworkable and in order to provide protection,
> there are solutions.
>
> Also, it becomes more relevant when people are trying to prove the
> weaknesses of SSL. Not to forget, facts say that most organizations who use
> SSL, use self signed certificates rather than a CA sign it.
>
> For sessions on non-SSL, there are many undocumented solutions which can be
> put into practice but such solutions needs to be well-reviewed and
> well-tested before they are implemented. I have come to know about one of
> the methods implemented by one of the top e-commerce portal giants. This
> solution is a bit tough to understand and subsequently implement it. Before
> I discuss it on the mailing list, I need to make sure that I understand it
> well. The only thing I can share at the moment is, it uses time-stamps.
> Hopefully, I would be discussing this proposition in detail in the upcoming
> Delhi Chapter meeting this month.
>
> Sorry if my talks were exaggerated. I still seek more ideas on the same
> question if someone is willing to share.
>
> Many thanks.
>
> On Thu, Jan 15, 2009 at 11:29 PM, Plash Chowdhary <
> *plash.chowdhary at tcs.com* <plash.chowdhary at tcs.com>> wrote:
>
> Gunwant,,
>
> Yes impractical "Off band validation" for each request in the conditions
> you have set. Now either you come up with a solution or im implimenting SSL
> *: )*
>
>
> Regards
> Plash  *"Gunwant Singh" <**gunwant.s at gmail.com* <gunwant.s at gmail.com>*>*
>
> 01/15/2009 10:27 AM
>
>   To
> "Plash Chowdhary" <*plash.chowdhary at tcs.com* <plash.chowdhary at tcs.com>>
> cc
> *owasp-delhi at lists.owasp.org* <owasp-delhi at lists.owasp.org>  Subject
> Re: [Owasp-delhi] SSL Broken..
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> I would happily accept what you say if you say how it protects.
>
> Tell me **how** would a sniffer miss your validation code on an
> unencrypted channel. We should talk about mitigating not minimizing.
>
> Oh ! unless you are saying, a different off band validation code is sent
> for **each** request - then it is possible but it is impractical even in
> high risk applications.
>
> On Thu, Jan 15, 2009 at 9:41 PM, Plash Chowdhary <
> *plash.chowdhary at tcs.com* <plash.chowdhary at tcs.com>> wrote:
>
> It does Gunwant, Use long one time off band validation....and keep a short
> TTL it will minimize the risk of relpay,....  *"Gunwant Singh" <**
> gunwant.s at gmail.com* <gunwant.s at gmail.com>*>*
>
> 01/15/2009 09:25 AM
>
>   To
> "Plash Chowdhary" <*plash.chowdhary at tcs.com* <plash.chowdhary at tcs.com>>
> cc
> *owasp-delhi at lists.owasp.org* <owasp-delhi at lists.owasp.org>  Subject
> Re: [Owasp-delhi] SSL Broken..
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> That doesn't affirm protection against replay attack, dude!
> In the transit, anyone can see your validation code...
> Even if you hash/encrypt it, still it can used to replay the traffic...
> this is vulnerable.. :)
>
> On Thu, Jan 15, 2009 at 3:46 AM, Plash Chowdhary <
> *plash.chowdhary at tcs.com* <plash.chowdhary at tcs.com>> wrote:
>
> verify user offline.. send an sms(or similar) with a validation code(long
> randomly genrated  string) to the user everytime he logs in to validate and
> use it everytime a transaction (high risk) is done or role is  changed..
> best way still will be to use it over SSL and use digital signatures
>
>
> Regards
> Plash  *"Gunwant Singh" <**gunwant.s at gmail.com* <gunwant.s at gmail.com>
> *>*
> Sent by: *owasp-delhi-bounces at lists.owasp.org*<owasp-delhi-bounces at lists.owasp.org>
>
> 01/14/2009 10:13 AM
>
>   To
> "Karthik Muthukrishnan" <*karthik.muthukrishnan at tcs.com*<karthik.muthukrishnan at tcs.com>
> >  cc
> *owasp-delhi at lists.owasp.org* <owasp-delhi at lists.owasp.org>  Subject
> Re: [Owasp-delhi] SSL Broken..
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Hi,
>
> Thanks for your reply but that did not answer my question. You are telling
> me what I can use for protecting the credentials. I know what I can use, but
> just out of curiousity I want to know if I don't use SSL/VPN or any other
> network based protection, what else can be done on the application layer in
> order to protect the credentials
> . Please see the answers below.
>
>
> On Wed, Jan 14, 2009 at 3:50 PM, Karthik Muthukrishnan <*
> karthik.muthukrishnan at tcs.com* <karthik.muthukrishnan at tcs.com>> wrote:
>
> > salted MD5 hashing protects the authentication credentials rightly from
> eavesdropping on the network.
> Salting is used to protect MD5 hashes from rainbow table attacks.
> Apparently Yes, although ultimately it protects authentication credentials
> only. Facts say the highest risk is eavesdropping if the session is
> unencrypted.
>
> > SSL does the same thing.
> Yes, SSL is used to ensure confidentiality and trust in the network
> communiation. Confidentiality (or prevention of network eavesdropping) is
> ensured by encryption. Trust is accomplished by Server and/or client
> certificates.
> I know what SSL does, but my question is something else.
>
> > However, in some scenarios SSL might not be feasible. For example,
> causing heavy load on the server or may be some applications don't support
> it, etc.
> In such cases SSL Accelerators are used. They are devices which can be fit
> into the architecture without changing the application or affecting the load
> on the application server.
>
> Again my question is something else. I know if SSL doesn't work,
> accelerators help expedite the processing. What I want to know is, if I "Do
> Not" want to use SSL what measures can be taken.
>
>
> > We can protect the authentication credentials using salted MD5 hashing
> or by using SSL.
> To protect authentication credentials in HTTP, we have to rely on SSL.
> Hashes are a secure (aka not in clear text) way to store authentication
> credentials.
> So you are proclaiming that we *have to* rely  on SSL- no other
> alternative.
> Hashes are also used in many applications for many different purposes
> besides authenticity and integrity.
>
>
> > In order to protect the Session credentials (Session ID, tokens,
> cookies, etc) on a non-SSL channel what measures can be taken?
> To protect either auth or session credentials we have to ensure
> confidentiality of the communication channel. If we dont use HTTPS, then VPN
> might be another option. While authentication credentials can be protected
> by some challenge handshake mechanism (similar to CHAP), we would need to
> protect session creds by encrypting the channel.
> I was asking that if we can provide some protection on the application
> level rather than on the network level. Besides SSL/VPN there are many
> options available for protecting the authentication credentials. I want to
> know (just out of curiousity) that how can we secure the session credentials
> on an unencrypted/non-SSL channel. I know this will take too much processing
> cycles, time synchronization, quantization in milliseconds even nanoseconds,
> affirmation of the key exchange, dynamic hashing key generation to mitigate
> replay attacks, and even more.
>
> I just want to know  if anyone has an idea on how it can be done if h/she
> is willing to share that would be really appreciative. Please make sure
> you understand what I am looking for.
> No offence :)
>
>
>
> Karthik
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> --
> Gunwant Singh
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> Gunwant Singh
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> Gunwant Singh
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> This message (including any attachments) is confidential and may be
> privileged. If you have received it by mistake please notify the sender by
> return e-mail and delete this message from your system. Any unauthorised use
> or dissemination of this message in whole or in part is strictly prohibited.
> Please note that e-mails are susceptible to change. ABN AMRO Central
> Enterprise Services Pvt Ltd, part of RBS Group plc , having its registered
> office at Empire Complex, 414 Senapati Bapat Marg, Lower Parel (W), Mumbai -
> 400 013 , including its group companies, shall not be liable for the
> improper or incomplete transmission of the information contained in this
> communication nor for any delay in its receipt or damage to your system. ABN
> AMRO Central Enterprise Services Pvt Ltd (or its group companies) does not
> guarantee that the integrity of this communication has been maintained nor
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-- 
Gunwant Singh
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