[Owasp-london] On sandboxes, and why you should care
dinis at ddplus.net
Thu Mar 30 04:16:08 EST 2006
On 29/03/06, Andrew van der Stock <vanderaj at greebo.net> wrote:
> Hi there,
As a response to your post, I will try to clarify why I believe that
Sandboxes are a fundamental piece in the security of Web Applications,
the hosting server(s) and the datacenter.
First of all, there are two issues with Verification. The first is
that you need verifiable code in both .Net and Java in order to run
that code in a Sandbox (Partial trust in .Net). The 2nd one is that if
you remove verification from the security benefits of .Net and Java,
and you admit that that is OK (which seems to be the current position
today), then you just eliminated some of the biggest security and
reliability features of these 'managed environments' (you also have
the problem that when (not if) you move your code to a secure sandbox
you will have many more problems to deal with (from performance to
unverifiable code issues))
> I must have missed a memo or something. I don't know about you, but
> I've reviewed many J2EE apps which had far greater things wrong than
> not running in a verified / trusted environment. I've never seen an
> attack which is realistic or usable for such attacks.
Really??? I am not so sure.
Lets look at some of your assets: The J2EE application, the supporting
database, the server(s) hosting your environment, the data center,
that companies internal network, the users (end-clients) and all users
(end-clients) that use all websites hosted in that data center (add to
this mix, items like: company public profile/confidence, customer's
private data, data privacy and SoX laws, and end up with a complex
multilayer mesh of assets)
Now, there are different levels of compromise here (I will just list some)
- J2EE application compromise
- Database compromise
- Web Server compromise
- Database server compromise
- Data center compromise
One of the main benefits of what I am defending (Sandboxing the
execution of code) is that you are able to dramatically limit the
damage created by (for example) malicious code executed on the
application's process space.
So for example, the damage of a file upload vulnerability (which
allows you to put a *.jsp file on the server and execute it) is
limited to the permissions allocated to the Sandbox.
The reality is that if you don't run that code with ANY sandbox, then
your entire Application, Server and Datacenter security is dependent
of the non existence of any malicious code in all applications running
on all web servers.
Also remember that more and more we will have to deal with malicious
developers, or with malicious attackers that are able to inject
malicious code into a website via:
- a library used by a developer
- a compromised developer account details (which tend to be sent by
- a compromised developer computer (infected via Spyware) which
allows the malicious attacker to control remotely that computer and
(for example) path Eclipse or Visual Studio in memory so that every
time a piece of code its submitted (checked-in) , the malicious
payloads are inserted.
If you add up the number of people that have the capability to put one
line of malicious code on a web server, you will see that this is a
very large number indeed.
A couple more examples of ways malicious code can be uploaded to the
server: SQL Injection, XSS (payload deployed to the admin section),
authorization vulnerabilities which allow the editing of files on the
server (via for example the CMS (content management system)),
manipulating params which control which method is executed (when
Reflection is used to perform late binding on method calls based on
the commands received) ,Social engineering, etc...
Sometimes you will even find CMS (Content Management Systems) that
provide power users (or 'area x' admins) with powerful customization
features which when exploited (or not, depending if this is a
'feature') allow the injection of code.
Do you really think that it is a good idea to have your entire data
center security and CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability)
depended on such extraordinary set of circumstances?
So the first main security benefit that we have with using Sandboxes
is: Containment, Damage Limitation, and Risk Reduction (you went from
full data center compromise to a local and limited problem)
Note: the reason that I say data center compromise, is because most
(if not all) data centers (and even corporate networks) are not
designed to sustain an attack executed from inside (especially when
the malicious attacker as admin control over one server)
> If I find (say) 100 things wrong, the business can afford the time
> and resources to fix 65 of these and the inclination to fix none. Any
> fix is a good fix from my point of view, but I need to be careful in
> what I strongly recommend to be fixed, and what I'll let go through
> to the keeper.
Sure, but out of those 100, how many allow remote command execution or
upload of scripts to the server?
So ironically, you could find your self in a position where the first
thing you should do (from a security point of view) would be to
isolate that server/application so that a compromise of that
application is limited to that application's assets.
> I'm sorry, but I can't recommend turning on the verifier and asking
> the devs to go through the painful effort of figuring out exactly
> what perms their code will require when there are actual exploitable
> issues (those 65 - 80 or so) which may cause actual financial loss.
Well that depends on what those issues are, but I agree with you that
converting existing applications designed to run outside a sandbox,
into 'Sandboxable' applications, is a massive project.
Also note that just turning on the verifier is not good enough. You
will need other protection layers.
What other Protection layers I am talking about? For example: "Offline
or realtime code profiling and analysis"
One of the reasons why I strongly believe that Full Trust code (and
the Java --noverify) should be verifiable, is because if it was, I
could analyse (offline and in real time) that code for security
problems and block its execution when malicious code is detected.
If the code is verifiable, I am able to make a series of security
decisions (with a high degree to certainty) based on the the 'risk
profile' of that code. For example: Does it make calls to unmanaged
code, does make calls to private members using reflection, does start
If the code is not verifiable then It is as good as trying to analyse
a C++ binary (you basically will have no ability to make hard
decisions because you just can't predict what is inside that binary
(or unverifiable code)). Which is the reason why signature based
Anti-Virus and Anti-Spyware applications are very bad at detecting new
virus, exploits or attacks.
So the 2nd security advantage that Verifiable code gives you is: Allow
Security decisions to be made based on pre-execution or real-time code
analysis / checks.
> Ditto asking for "final" and other modifiers to be used. Turning on
> the verifier / forcing the assertion of required privs requires a
> complete re-test. For many larger apps, testing can cost millions of
In the current environment yes (because these applications where
designed to run with maximum privileges), but when (not if) the
applications are designed (or modified) to run in sandboxes, then the
cost of changing them to run on 'secure run-time environments' will be
more acceptable. Which is one of the reasons why the sooner
Sandboxable code starts to be created the better.
> How much has been lost with this attack? Ever?
Well, that depends on how you measure this cost?
Remember for example, that the reason why most Buffer Overflows are so
dangerous is because the payload is executed outside a sandbox :)
So I can argue that a vulnerability that allows remote .Net or Java
code to be executed on the victim, is as dangerous as a Buffer
And I think there have some some financial losses out there due to
Buffer Overflows exploits, don't you agree? :)
Take for example the latest Microsoft Office Buffer Overflow
vulnerabilities. Which one is more dangerous, a Word file with such
exploit (and payload) or a Word file with that payload injected inside
a Macro? (note that in Office 2003, Macros are .Net assemblies which
require Full Trust to execute). The risk profile is about the same for
both, since both have a 90% chance of being executed.
> Remember, the mitigant to many risks may not be a technical control;
> it may be reactive (audit), legal (T&C's / contracts), or it may be
> process driven, such as settlement periods.
> I'm interested - has *anyone* seen an attack (.NET or J2EE) which
> aims at the trust model of the underlying VM?
I have (but can't talk about it). Humm, where do you see a 'trust
model on the underlying VM'? If you are running with Full Trust or
--noverify, the only 'trust model' that exists is the same one that
exists for unmanaged (C++) applications (for example OS based ACL
But if you want a very good public example, look at the PHP XML-RPC
worms which do exactly that. They use a vulnerability in a
application's feature, to upload code to the server and execute it
from the inside (in most cases making those computer boot-net zombies
used to launch other attacks)
If these PHP applications were running inside a sandbox, then this
worm would have never been possible if that Sandbox (for example) did
not allow direct outbound connections.
> Has it lost anyone any
> money / reputation / shareholder confidence?
Money yes, reputation and shareholder confidence, not really.
There is a small number of public disclosure of this type of attacks,
and the media doesn't tend to report that the problem is 'lack of
Sandboxing' (see the coverage on the PHP XML-RPC worm)
> I'm happy to hear if
> there has been,
Sometimes all it takes is to look at reality with another perspective.
After my explanations, do you still think that this is a non-issue
> but otherwise, I'd like to think we have more
> important things to educate devland on than worrying about a risk
> which doesn't really rate.
Well I strongly disagree that this 'risk doesn't really rate', but
since we are talking about 'devland'. let me give you my final reason
why I believe the development of verifiable and sandboxable code is so
And the reason is: To allow privilege separation and to make source
code audits practical and accountable.
Lets take typical source-code security audit project. You get given an
application (App A) that has 500,000 lines of code (executed with Full
Trust or with --noverify), and you are given 1 week to: understand the
app, audit the code, find vulnerabilities, write proof of concepts and
write your report.
Now, if you need to look at every single one of those 500,000 lines of
code, can you really do it in that time frame?
Can you provide a strong level of assurance to your client that that
application has no major vulnerabilities?
No way, because you known that all you need is 1 vulnerable method
inside that 500,000 block of code, to compromise the entire solution.
So let's look at another application (App B) which has the same
functionality but, is executed in three Sandboxes:
- Sandbox A) 450,000 lines of code executed in very restricted
Sandbox (let's say Asp.Net Low Trust)
- Sandbox B) 48,000 lines of code executed in secure Sandbox (let's
say customized version of Asp.Net Medium Trust)
- Sandbox C) 2,000 lines of code executed in a Sandbox which allows
calls to unmanaged code.
Given the same 1 week, you (as the security consultant auditing this
application) will spend most of your time in Sandbox C) code, less on
Sandbox B) code and even less on Sandbox A) code. Why? because only a
vulnerability in Sandbox C) would allow the compromise of the entire
App / Server / Datacenter.
More importantly, a vulnerability which in Sandbox A) you would mark
with a Critical Risk rating, in App A (due to the different DREAD
score) you would marked it with a Low Risk rating. Same code,
different Sandboxes, different Risk Profiles :)
And this brings me back to my frustration with the current status quo
(which is to write everything for Full Trust / --noverify
environments), because we already have working solutions that allow
the creation of applications like App B. What we don't have is
awareness, focus, commitment and client pressure to do it.
If today there is a good understanding / acknowledgment that
applications that need to be executed with Admin or System privileges
is not good security practices, then let's extend this and realise
that that Full Trust / --noverify code is also as bad.
I strongly believe that only when the majority (and eventually all)
applications we use look like App B (or even App C with 100% code
execution in a secure sandbox) we will have trustworthy computing
Hope my explanations make sense
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